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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
This brief is filed in reply to plaintiff's response 
on the state action issue, which was raised by cross-petition 
and addressed in Point I of Respondents1 Brief. (Resp. Br. at 
11-18.) However, in passing, defendants feel compelled to 
respond briefly to plaintiff's repeated allegations of 
misrepresentation and improper limitation of issues. 
Regarding the facts, defendants have carefully 
documented each assertion with citations to the record and the 
Court of Appeals opinion. Defendants stand behind those 
assertions and invite the Court to verify any of the citations. 
Defendants have never stated or implied that plaintiff's 
unsavory social history or paternal indifference rendered his 
rights unimportant or undeserving of protection, only that the 
degree of protection required is not equal to that accorded 
married or registered fathers. Plaintiff cannot escape or cloud 
the facts, however uncomplimentary they may be, with claims of 
misrepresentation and distortion. 
As for the scope of issues on appeal, defendants 
demonstrated that neither the state action issue, the state 
equal protection argument, nor the adoption by acknowledgment 
argument was timely raised on appeal. (Resp. Br. at 11, 34 n.5, 
and 44.) Plaintiff responds that the issues were "briefed" and 
that defendants are merely trying to avoid the issues. (Reply 
Br. of Pet. at 13, 19, and 20.) However, plaintiff fails to 
clarify that he addressed the state action and state equal 
protection issues only in his Reply Brief to the Court of 
Appeals (Reply Brief of Appellant to Ct. of App. at 8, 13), 
after it was too late for defendants to respond. Accordingly, 
under this Court's appellate rules those issues may not be 
considered. Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1169 n.6 (Utah 
1988). Plaintiff's discussion of the adoption by acknowledgment 
statute was buried indistinguishably in his federal equal 
protection argument. (Brief of Appellant to Ct. of App. at 
15-17), and was raised as a separate argument for the first time 
in this Court. Therefore, that issue, as well, was raised too 
late. Madsen v. Brown, 701 P.2d 1086, 1088 (Utah 1985).X It is 
apparent, then, that defendants do not seek to avoid properly 
raised issues, but to maintain fair and orderly presentation of 
issues. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff abandoned the state action issue by failing 
to raise it until his Reply Brief to the Court of Appeals; 
Plaintiff cites a footnote in defendants1 
Memorandum In Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction as 
evidence that the adoption by acknowledgment issue was disputed 
in the district court and should be remanded there for 
resolution. (Reply Br. of Pet. at 20.) However, the order 
denying a preliminary injunction is not on appeal; rather, it is 
the Judgment granting defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The adoption by acknowledgment issue was not raised by that 
motion, and plaintiff never claimed that it was disputed or that 
there were any issues precluding summary judgment. 
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accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in addressing the issue. 
This Court is in no way bound by the state action 
ruling of the federal district court. L.D.S. Social Services 
did not engage in state action by accepting temporary custody of 
the illegitimate newborn. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANTS ENGAGED IN NO STATE ACTION TO INVOKE THE 
PROTECTIONS OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS. 
As addressed in Respondents1 Brief, pages 11-12, and 
summarized above, plaintiff abandoned the state action issue by 
failing to raise it until his Reply Brief to the Court of 
Appeals. Von Hake v. Thomas, supra. Plaintiff offers no 
justification for his failure to raise the issue in a timely 
manner and provides no authority for consideration of the issue 
by the Court of Appeals. (Reply Br. of Pet. at 19.) Therefore, 
the Court of Appeals' state action ruling should be reversed on 
that basis alone. 
On the merits of the state action issue, plaintiff 
asks this Court simply to "adopt" the federal court ruling in 
Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services, 670 F. Supp. 1537 (D. Utah 
1987). (Reply Br. of Pet. at 18.) However, as demonstrated in 
Respondents1 Brief, pages 14-18, this Court's blind adherence to 
that federal decision is neither required nor desirable. 
While the issue of state action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
is governed by federal law, this Court is not bound by a lower 
-3-
federal court's construction of federal law. Beckmann v. 
Beckmann, 685 P.2d 1045, 1049 (Utah 1984) (state court not bound 
by bankruptcy court adjudication); Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 
28 Cal.3d 807, 623 P.2d 165, 179 (1981) (state court is "under 
no obligation to follow federal lower court precedents 
interpreting acts of Congress when we find those precedents 
unpersuasive"); State v. Harmon, 107 Idaho 73, 685 P.2d 814, 817 
(1984) (refusing to follow federal district court decision 
holding state statute unconstitutional). This is especially 
true when, as here, the federal question at issue is unsettled. 
Modern Supply Co. v. Federal Savings & Loan Ins. Corp., 50 Wash. 
App. 194, 748 P.2d 251, 254 (1987). In any event, since section 
1983 applies only to the deprivation of federal constitutional 
rights, e.g., Bellevue Fire Fighters Local 1604 v. City of 
Bellevue, 100 Wash.2d 748, 675 P.2d 592, 597 (1984), what 
constitutes state action under state constitutional provisions 
is purely a question of state law, on which the federal Swayne 
decision has no relevance. See Swainston v. Intermountain 
Health Care, Inc., 766 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1988) (state court 
not bound by federal court's ruling on disqualification motion); 
Beal v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 418, 454 P.2d 624, 625 (1969) (state 
court not bound by federal court decision on right to counsel at 
parole hearing). 
The federal Swayne decision is not only uncontrolling, 
but unpersuasive. It is based on the false premise that L.D.S. 
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Social Services terminated plaintiff's paternal rights. As 
noted in Respondents' Brief, page 16, at the time the child was 
relinquished plaintiff's rights were not fully vested. Whatever 
inchoate rights he did have were surrendered or forfeited by his 
own indifference and inaction. Wells v. Children's Aid Society, 
681 P.2d 199, 202 (Utah 1984). And that forfeiture is not 
legally final until the adoption decree is entered, permanently 
severing all natural parental rights and vesting those rights in 
the adoptive parents. Accordingly, L.D.S. Social Services' act 
of accepting temporary custody of the infant did not "terminate" 
plaintiff's rights and cannot be considered state action. (In 
addition to authorities cited in Respondents' Brief, see Shirley 
v. State National Bank, 493 F.2d 739, 744 (2nd Cir. 1974) (mere 
codification of common law does not give rise to state action); 
Rosewell v. Hanrahan, 523 N.E.2d 10, 12 (111. App. 1988) (no 
state action in private adoption proceeding).) 
Finally, plaintiff argues, without authority, that 
this Court may address the constitutional issues regardless of 
state action. (Reply Br. of Pet. at 19.) Obviously, that is 
untrue. By the very language of section 1983 and the 
constitutional provisions at issue, state action is a necessary 
prerequisite to any relief. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 
830, 838 (1982); Kruqer v. Wells Fargo Bank, 11 Cal.3d 352, 521 
P.2d 441, 444 (1974) ("private action, however hurtful, is not 
unconstitutional"); Nakamoto v. Fasi, 635 P.2d 946, 952 (Haw. 
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1981) ("constitutional safeguards were designed to protect the 
individual from [unlawful] conduct on the part of government 
officials"); Under 21 v. City of New York, 65 N.Y.2d 344, 482 
N.E-2d 1 (1985) (good general discussion of state action 
principles). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the 
Court of Appeals1 state action ruling on the grounds that (1) 
plaintiff abandoned the state action issue by not timely raising 
it in the Court of Appeals; or (2) defendants did not engage in 
state action. 
DATED this j2f"^ay of June, 1989. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
By, lZf+„& &. Tfa^, 
David M. McConkie 
Merr i l l F. Nelson 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Respondents, 
Cross-Pet i t ioners 
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